0046 — Session approval tier for the worker shell gate (v86)
Status
Accepted (v86). Superseded in part by ES-F293 (decision D43): a plain approve on a worker gate is one decision and saves no session grant, because the gate card never offered one. The read side and the startup clear remain.
Question
The shell-gate lane had two approval scopes: a plain approve covered one run chain, and "approve & remember" was permanent. The operator's ask: a plain approve should hold for the session, with "always" as the explicit escalation. What is the session tier's shape, and how does it avoid becoming a shadow permission system (I5) or a silent ramp to permanence?
Decision
Three tiers, one engine:
| Tier | Trigger | Writes | Cleared |
|---|---|---|---|
| once | approve on a guarded-class command | nothing standing (verdict rides the run chain) | — |
| session | plain approve | session_allowed_shell_commands |
at serve startup |
| always | approve & remember / allow_shell_command / presets |
allowed_shell_commands (+ project policy) |
never (operator edits) |
- One engine (I5). The session tier is a settings key merged
read-side in
_shell_allowlist_for— the single choke point every dispatch path (serve, CLI, scheduler) already resolves through. No new gate, no second allow-logic. - Guard classes never persist. Remote-git (v19-F3/F4), dangerous prefixes, and outbound-content prefixes (ADR 0044) are filtered before the session write AND on every read (the v19-F3 read-side pin applies to the session key too). For those commands a plain approve stays exactly what it was: once.
- No silent promotion.
policy_viewexposes the session tier under its own key; the durable union writers (remember, presets,allow_shell_command) read onlyallowed_shell_commands, so a session grant can never leak into permanence. - Session = serve process lifetime. Startup clears the key and logs what it dropped (I8). Restarting skep is the honest "revoke everything I approved today" gesture; per-chat scoping was considered and rejected — approvals arrive from the web queue, Discord, and the deck, which share no chat identity.
- The resolution note says the scope out loud ("approval held for this serve session"), so the ledger records which tier fired (I8, I13).
Queen-side mutation cards are deliberately untouched: outbound content
must card every time by mechanism (ADR 0044), and scope-level "always"
already exists as learned rules (allow_mcp_tool,
allow_fetch_domain, allow_shell_command).
Consequences
- Approving
uv run pytestonce stops the identical re-card for every later run until the daemon restarts. - The trust surface an operator holds in their head shrinks to two questions: "is this fine today?" (approve) and "is this fine forever?" (remember) — with the guarded classes exempt from both.
Amended: the session tier has two mechanisms (v90-F3, recorded v106-F11)
The text above describes the tier as it shipped in v86: the
session_allowed_shell_commands settings key, read-side merged into the
worker's shell allowlist. v90-F3 extended the same operator promise —
"an approval holds until the daemon restarts" — to the Queen's own
fetch/shell actions with a second mechanism: session-provenance learned
rules (provenance: "session:<actor>") on the one learned-rule list the
policy engine already resolves (I5). Same lifecycle (serve startup drops
both, logging what went), same guard-class exemptions (remote git,
dangerous commands, outbound content can never session-persist), one
authorization boundary.
This amendment was promised by v90-F5 and never written; the 2026-07-29
audit found the ADR describing half the architecture. Since v106-F11 a
learned rule also records created_at, and the "ran without asking"
receipt names the covering grant's tier and grant time.