ADR 0006 — Supervisor-side re-verification (G10, v2)
Date: 2026-06-11 · Status: accepted
Context
v1 recorded a deliberate trust gap (G10): the run record's verification outcome
was whatever the worker reported. A buggy or dishonest worker could claim
completed / passed and the supervisor would believe it. The patch-as-approval
model (ADR 0002) means a human reviews evidence before applying — but "review
evidence, not promises" is hollow if the central piece of evidence (did
verification actually pass?) is itself an unchecked promise.
Decision
After a run the worker reports completed, the supervisor re-verifies it
independently (skep/supervisor/reverify.py):
- Create a fresh, clean git worktree at the same baseline (
repo@ref). git applythe worker's patch artifact to it.- Re-run the worker's own recorded verification command(s) under the Seatbelt sandbox (deny-all network, writes confined to the throwaway worktree).
- Compare exit codes: all zero ⇒
passed; any non-zero ⇒failed; command not found (127) ⇒unavailable(the supervisor lacks the toolchain — it cannot honestly confirm or deny).
The worker surfaces the verification command(s) in the verify.result event
payload (commands: list[str]). The contract Event keeps unknown payload keys
verbatim, so this is additive — not a contract change, and no golden fixture
regenerates.
The result is stored in its own reverifications row alongside the worker's
claim, with confirmed = (worker said passed AND re-run passed). The canonical
run state stays exactly what the worker reported; re-verification is a parallel,
equally-durable supervisor judgment. When they disagree, status and review
say so loudly ("NOT CONFIRMED — DO NOT TRUST"), and (ADR 0007) auto-approval
refuses to fire.
Why not a "validator" agent
The decision record was explicit: the validator is a ~plain function, not a third agent. Re-verification trusts only the exit code of a command the worker already recorded — there is nothing for an LLM to decide. Adding an agent would re-introduce the very trust problem it exists to close.
Consequences
- The G10 gap is closed for
completedclaims with a patch and a recorded command. A lying worker (claims passed, patch fails the command) is caught — proven by aMODE:liarfake worker and by the real worker re-runningpyteston a clean worktree. - Re-verification reuses the Stage A sandbox, so the supervisor's own re-run is itself network-denied and write-confined.
- Honest limits: re-verification fidelity assumes the supervisor shares the
worker's toolchain (true in v2 — co-located on one Mac, G3); a missing tool is
reported as
unavailable, never a falsefailed. It does not re-verifyfailed/pending_approval/no-patch runs (nothing was claimed verified).